Diffusion Unlearning Optimization for Robust and Safe Text-to-Image Models

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1. Introduction

Recently, as the performance of text-to-image models [\(Rom](#page-2-0)[bach et al.,](#page-2-0) [2022;](#page-2-0) [Ho et al.,](#page-2-1) [2020\)](#page-2-1) has significantly improved, there have been many concerns about their negative social impact. For example, these models can be used to generate explicit or violent images, and often create copyrighted images. Blocking inappropriate content with classifiers is one available approach, but attackers can bypass this by using the publicly available model weights. This poses a risk for many services and companies that publish their model weights, ultimately hindering the advancement of T2I model research.

To solve this problem, recent studies [\(Gandikota et al.,](#page-2-2) [2023;](#page-2-2) [Kumari et al.,](#page-2-3) [2023;](#page-2-3) [Zhang et al.,](#page-2-4) [2023a;](#page-2-4) [Heng & Soh,](#page-2-5) [2024;](#page-2-5) [Gandikota et al.,](#page-2-6) [2024\)](#page-2-6) have aimed to remove unwanted concepts from the models. While removing target concepts, it is desired that the performance on non-target concepts remains as close to the original model as possible. Existing studies mainly adopted methods to block the flow of prompts containing unsafe keywords within the model. Since the blocking is only applied to specific prompts, it has the advantage of preserving non-target concepts. However, they have the disadvantage of being vulnerable to adversarial prompt attacks as shown in Figure [1.](#page-0-0) Recent studies [\(Tsai](#page-2-7) [et al.,](#page-2-7) [2023;](#page-2-7) [Pham et al.,](#page-2-8) [2023;](#page-2-8) [Yang et al.,](#page-2-9) [2024\)](#page-2-9) have shown that adversarial attacks using prompts are possible even in black-box scenarios. This demonstrates that visual features themselves need to be unlearned to prevent vulnerability to such prompt attacks.

We propose a method to prevent the model from creating unsafe visual features regardless of the prompt. This differs from existing methods that shallowly block information conveyed from the prompt. The biggest challenge is that

Figure 1. Task Visualization: Existing prompt-based unlearning methods primarily focused on unlearning the prompt's embedding or the dependent cross-attention layers. While these methods do not compromise the quality of unrelated topic images, they have the drawback of being vulnerable to adversarial prompts.

unlearning visual features may reduce the image generation quality for unrelated topics. To prevent this, we propose a method to precisely guide the model to forget only the unwanted concepts. First, we used SDEdit to generate paired ground truth images that remove the unsafe concepts from images containing these concepts. Using paired data for supervised learning is common in prompt-based unlearning methods. However, since we aim for the model to not generate the unsafe visual features regardless of the prompt, supervised learning is not suitable. Therefore, we used the Direct Preference Optimization (DPO) method to guide the model to prefer generating the paired ground truth images over the images containing unsafe concepts.

We demonstrate that using paired data for preference optimization is effective in selectively unlearning visual features. To this end, we show that our method is robust against adversarial prompt attacks, which existing prompt-based unlearning methods are vulnerable to.

2. Related Work

Recently, there has been active research on safety mechanisms to prevent text-to-image models from generating images with unwanted concepts. One prominent approach is fine-tuning-based unlearning, which is advantageous as it avoids the need for training from scratch. Notable works like ESD [\(Gandikota et al.,](#page-2-2) [2023\)](#page-2-2), CA [\(Kumari et al.,](#page-2-3) [2023\)](#page-2-3), UCE [\(Gandikota et al.,](#page-2-6) [2024\)](#page-2-6), Forget-me-not [\(Zhang et al.,](#page-2-4) [2023a\)](#page-2-4), and SA [\(Heng & Soh,](#page-2-5) [2024\)](#page-2-5) have developed methods to handle unsafe prompts during training.

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Figure 2. To guide the model to unlearn only the desired concept without losing the ability to generate unrelated concepts, we generate synthetic paired data using SDE dit. We use \blacksquare for publication purposes.

However, these strategies are often susceptible to adversarial prompt attacks [\(Tsai et al.,](#page-2-7) [2023;](#page-2-7) [Pham et al.,](#page-2-8) [2023;](#page-2-8) [Yang](#page-2-9) [et al.,](#page-2-9) [2024;](#page-2-9) [Chin et al.,](#page-2-10) [2023;](#page-2-10) [Zhang et al.,](#page-2-11) [2023b;](#page-2-11) [Han](#page-2-12) [et al.,](#page-2-12) [2024\)](#page-2-12). Our research aims to develop a robust safety mechanism that can withstand red teaming efforts.

3. Method

We aim to remove visual features associated with unsafe concepts from the model. Although we experimented with diffusion models, we believe that this approach can be broadly applied to other image synthesis methods as well. The loss function of the diffusion model [\(Ho et al.,](#page-2-1) [2020\)](#page-2-1) is commonly expressed as follows:

$$
L_{\text{DSM}} = \mathbb{E}_{x_0 \sim q(x_0), x_t \sim q(x_t | x_0)}[||\epsilon - \epsilon_{\theta}(x_t)||_2^2]
$$
 (1)

Where x_0 is an image and x_t is a noisy image sampled from where x_0 is an image and x_t is a noisy mage sampled from
 $q(x_t|x_0) = \mathcal{N}(\sqrt{\alpha_t}x_0, \sqrt{1-\alpha_t}I)$. $\epsilon_{\theta}(\cdot)$ is the model that predicts the added noise ϵ .

Direct Preference Optimization (DPO) [\(Rafailov et al.,](#page-2-13) [2024\)](#page-2-13), which is a type of preference optimization, has been studied for application to diffusion models in previous research [\(Wallace et al.,](#page-2-14) [2023\)](#page-2-14). The final equation in this paper is summarized as follows. For detailed derivation, please refer to the referenced paper.

$$
LDiffusion-DPO \le -\mathbb{E}[\log \sigma(-\beta T\omega(\lambda_t))
$$

$$
d_{pref} - d_{dispref})]
$$
 (2)

$$
d_{pref} = ||\epsilon - \epsilon_{\theta}(x_t^+, t)||_2^2 - ||\epsilon - \epsilon_{\phi}(x_t^+, t)||_2^2 \quad (3)
$$

$$
d_{dispref} = (||\epsilon - \epsilon_{\theta}(x_t^-, t)||_2^2 + ||\epsilon - \epsilon_{\phi}(x_t^-, t)||_2^2)
$$
 (4)

Where x_t^+ is a prefered noisy image and x_t^- is an unprefered noisy image. ϵ_{ϕ} denotes the pretrained model and ϵ_{θ} is the fine-tuned model.

Figure 3. Qualitative results on nudity attacked by Ring-A-Bell method. We use \blacksquare for publication purposes.

Figure 4. Quantitative results on nudity. With same prior preservation score, our method is more robust on (left) Ring-A-Bell and (right) Concept Inversion.

By using this method, we can increase the probability that the diffusion model generates preferred images while gradually decreasing the probability of generating dispreferred images. We apply this to the unlearning task by replacing dispreferred images with unsafe images and preferred images with safe images. To generate these safe and unsafe pairs, we used SDEdit [\(Meng et al.,](#page-2-15) [2021\)](#page-2-15) to create synthetic paired data, as shown in Figure [2.](#page-1-0) Additionally, we discovered a trick to help the model more reliably maintain its prior. This involves ensuring that the noise predicted by the two models is similar for complete noise. We added the following term to the loss function for optimization.

$$
L_{\text{prior}} = ||\epsilon_{\phi}(x_T) - \epsilon_{\theta}(x_T)||_2^2 \tag{5}
$$

4. Experiments

We conducted unlearning for nudity and applied two types of red-teaming attacks: Ring-A-Bell [\(Tsai et al.,](#page-2-7) [2023\)](#page-2-7) and Concept Inversion [\(Pham et al.,](#page-2-8) [2023\)](#page-2-8). To generate the dataset, we used prompts containing 'naked' as unsafe prompts and replaced them with prompts containing 'dressed' to create paired sets. Using these, we generated 64 pairs of images for the unlearning training.

Compared to ESD [\(Gandikota et al.,](#page-2-2) [2023\)](#page-2-2), UCE [\(Gandikota](#page-2-6) [et al.,](#page-2-6) [2024\)](#page-2-6), and SPM [\(Lyu et al.,](#page-2-16) [2023\)](#page-2-16) unlearning methods, our approach demonstrated significantly more robustness against prompt attacks. We presented qualitative results in

Figure [3.](#page-1-1) For quantitative evaluation, we used NudeNet [\(Be](#page-2-17)[dapudi,](#page-2-17) [2019\)](#page-2-17) to determine the defense success rate and calculated LPIPS score [\(Zhang et al.,](#page-2-18) [2018\)](#page-2-18) for unrelated topics as a prior preservation score. The results are presented in Figure [4.](#page-1-2)

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